III
Japan claims that the leaders of Japan and China did not reach understanding and consensus on "shelving the dispute over Diaoyu Dao" during the negotiations for the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972 and the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Could this be true? For the sake of clarity, let us look at the authoritative historical records, including the minutes of the talks.
It is known to all that it was with the China-Japan Joint Statement (1972) and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1978) that China and Japan finally ended the state of war and normalized bilateral relations. These two documents formed the bilateral legal basis for the resolution of the postwar ownership of relevant territories between China and Japan.
Under the third item of the China-Japan Joint Statement, which concerns the issue of Taiwan, the Japanese side explicitly committed that "it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." It was further confirmed in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship that "the principles enunciated in the Joint Statement should be strictly observed." The core of Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation referred to in the Joint Statement is that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." To be more specific, as stated clearly in the Cairo Declaration, "All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." This was a serious commitment Japan had made to the Chinese side in the form of bilateral treaties. Although it was a commitment made in the context of the issue of Taiwan, it is applicable to the issue of Diaoyu Dao because Diaoyu Dao is Taiwan's affiliated island. It is worth noting that the Cairo Declaration mentioned these territories in the form of non-exhaustive enumeration. What it emphasized was that the territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese through whatever means, be it Taiwan and the Pescadores, which had been formally ceded to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, or Manchuria, which had been under Japan's actual control through the puppet government, or Chinese territories stolen by Japan through other means, shall all be restored to China. Therefore, even though Japan claimed that Diaoyu Dao was not ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki as Taiwan's affiliated island, Japan could not deny that the island was stolen by Japan from China following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and that the island, as such, must be restored to China.
During negotiations for the signing of the China-Japan Joint Statement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Chinese and Japanese leaders, acting in the larger interest of bilateral relations, decided not to involve the issue of Diaoyu Dao for the time being and leave it to be resolved later. This, however, does not constitute an excuse for the Japanese side to deny its commitment afterwards. The principle that the postwar ownership of relevant territories should be resolved in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, as enshrined in the China-Japan Joint Statement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, still applies to the issue of Diaoyu Dao.
At a recent press conference, Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba cited from the conversation between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Premier Zhou Enlai in 1972 about Diaoyu Dao. He said that Japan and China did not reach common understanding on this issue. For the sake of clarification, again, let's read the following, which is the main part of what was really discussed in the conversation:
Prime Minister Tanaka: I wish to take this opportunity to ask about China's attitude towards the Senkaku Islands.
Premier Zhou: I do not want to discuss this issue this time. It is no good discussing it now.
Prime Minister Tanaka: It may make things difficult for me when I go back if I did not mention this issue at all while I was in Beijing.
Premier Zhou: That's right, because oil has been discovered under that part of the sea. Now Taiwan is trying to make a big issue out of it. The United States might do so, too. The issue has been blown out of proportion.
That was where Minister Gemba's citation ended. But in fact, Prime Minister Tanaka went on to say: Alright. There is no need to discuss it then. Let's talk about it sometime in the future.
Premier Zhou: Let's talk about it in the future. This time, let us first resolve the big and fundamental issues that we can resolve, such as the normalization of bilateral relations. It is not that other issues are not "big", but that normalization of relations is pressing. Some issues need to be discussed at a later time.
Prime Minister Tanaka: I believe other issues can be resolved once the relations are normalized.
What issue were they referring to that needed to be resolved? It was quite clear with the then Chinese and Japanese leaders. It was this - the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, signed between the United States and Japan on June 17, 1971, stated that the power of administration over the Ryukyu Islands and other islands shall be returned to Japan, and arbitrarily included Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands into the territories to be returned. On Dec 30, 1971, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China issued a statement, stressing that the backroom deals between the United States and Japan over Diaoyu Dao and other islands were completely illegal and could by no means change the People's Republic of China's territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Dao Islands. So it was not vague at all what issue needed to be resolved. It was the issue of sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. Minister Gemba cited only part of the conversation. Was it because he had no access to the full text? Or did he do it on purpose?
In October 1978, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Japan for the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Commenting on the issue of Diaoyu Dao at a press conference following his talks with Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Mr Deng said, "When China and Japan normalized relations, both countries agreed not to involve this issue. When we negotiated the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we also agreed not to deal with this issue. We believe that it is wiser to set the issue aside for a while if we couldn't bridge our difference this time. It is okay to temporarily shelve such an issue if our generation does not have enough wisdom to resolve it. The next generation will have more wisdom, and I am sure they will eventually find a way acceptable to both sides." No one on the Japanese side made any objection on this note.
Mr. Zhang Xiangshan, late advisor to the Chinese foreign ministry, and many others, both in China and Japan, have been personally involved in or witnessed these historical episodes surrounding the negotiations for the normalization of China-Japan relations and the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. They have each, in their own way, recounted these historical facts. Their accounts prove that both China and Japan were clear about whether the two countries had reached understanding and consensus on shelving the dispute over Diaoyu Dao.
Japan has proved to be a country that dared to alter and deny authoritative historical records from just a few decades ago. It even dared to change what had been put down in black and white in history. Is there anything Japan dares not do?
I’ve lived in China for quite a considerable time including my graduate school years, travelled and worked in a few cities and still choose my destination taking into consideration the density of smog or PM2.5 particulate matter in the region.