The Russians, by not objecting to the area where the maneuvers will be held, are sending a message to Japan that signing up for US-ordered sanctions against Russia would entail a cost. In a public statement in March, Putin made it clear that Moscow does not intend to conclude a military alliance with Beijing, but the mere invocation of that possibility is a signal that the vector of Russian foreign policy has changed dramatically. Only four years ago, then president Dmitry Medvedev - with then prime minister Putin squarely behind him - were offering a "joint defense perimeter" to NATO. Today, NATO again considers Russia an adversary, and vice-versa.

The Ukraine crisis came in part as a US response to Russia's growing toughness, as evidenced, for example, in its handling of the Syrian crisis and the Edward Snowdenaffair. Putin believes the era of US global dominance is coming to an end.

Pursuant to that conclusion, Russia's foreign policy has been seeking ways to strengthen ties with leading non-Western powers, above all China and India, and other emerging economies, from Brazil to Egypt to Indonesia to Iran. This will not be easy, in view of Russia's relatively weak and currently stagnant economy, but not entirely impossible, because in fields such as armaments and nuclear energy, space technology and grain exports, Russia continues to be a leading player.

A veteran, among other engagements, of the Great Game, the two world wars and the Cold War, Russia has few illusions about international politics. It clearly sees the damage that the current confrontation with the US has inflicted upon it. It deplores the breakdown in its relations with the EU and its leading power, Germany. It understands power balances, and knows it now has a much weaker hand than what it had even a year ago in dealing with China. Yet it will not back off. Instead, it will press ahead with its agenda aimed at restoring Russia's role as one of the leading global players.

It is not clear whether Russia will succeed in this endeavor. To succeed, it will have, above all, to address its flaws and weaknesses, from corruption and stifling economic monopolism to the low education and health standards of its population. The key factor will be the quality of the Russian elite, too preoccupied since the fall of the Soviet Union with making themselves rich by any means available. The emergence of a truly national and modern elite is a sine qua non for Russia getting its act together.

The author is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.