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"We suffer from a massive 'blind spot' in our cargo security measures," Sen. Norm Coleman (news, bio, voting record), R-Minn., said in a statement.
Coleman also said the GAO's border security investigation "demonstrated that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is stuck in a pre-9/11 mind-set in a post-9/11 world and must modernize its procedures."
The commission, in charge of overseeing nuclear reactor and nuclear substance safety, disagreed.
"Security has been of prime importance for us on the materials front and the power plant front since 9/11," commission spokesman David McIntyre said.
To test security at U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, GAO investigators last year represented themselves as employees of a fake company and obtained cesium-137.
They attempted to cross into the United States with the substance — enough to possibly create two crude radiological bombs that could spread radiation if spread by the blast of a conventional explosive.
When stopped, the investigators presented counterfeit shipping papers and NRC documents that allegedly permitted them to receive, acquire, possess and transfer radioactive substances.
Investigators found that customs agents weren't able to check whether a person caught with radioactive materials was permitted to possess the materials under a government-issued license.
"Unless nuclear smugglers in possession of faked license documents raised suspicions in some other way, CBP officers could follow agency guidelines yet unwittingly allow them to enter the country with their illegal nuclear cargo," a report said. It described this problem as "a significant gap" in the nation's safety procedures.
Vayl Oxford, who heads the Homeland Security Department's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, said the substance could have been used in a radiological weapon with limited effects.