Despite United States' political gridlock and economic woes, China will not replace it as the world's leading power

The United States is going through difficult times. Its post-2008 recovery has been slow, and some observers fear that Europe's financial problems could tip the US and world economy into a second recession.

US politics, moreover, remains gridlocked over budgetary issues, and compromise will be even more difficult on the eve of the 2012 election, when Republicans hope that economic problems will help them unseat President Barack Obama. In these circumstances, many are predicting the US' decline, especially relative to China.

And it's not just pundits who think so. A recent Pew poll found that in 15 of 22 countries surveyed, most people believe that China either will replace or has replaced America as "the world's leading superpower". In Britain, those putting China on top rose to 47 percent, from 34 percent in 2009. Similar trends are evident in Germany, Spain, and France. Indeed, the poll found more pessimistic views of the US among its oldest and closest allies than in Latin America, Japan, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. Even in the US people are divided equally about whether China will replace the US as a global superpower.

Such sentiments reflect the slow growth and fiscal problems that followed the 2008 financial crisis, but they are not historically unprecedented. US citizens have a long history of incorrectly estimating their power. In the 1950's and 1960's, after Sputnik, many thought that the Soviets might get the better of America; in the 1980's, it was the Japanese. Now it is the Chinese. But, with America's debt on the way to equaling its national income in a decade, and a fumbling political system that cannot seem to address the country's fundamental challenges, are the "declinists" finally right?

Much will depend on the uncertainties, often underestimated, brought about by future changes in China. Economic growth will bring China closer to the US in power resources, but that doesn't necessarily mean that China will surpass the US as the most powerful country.

China's gross domestic product (GDP) will almost certainly surpass that of the US within a decade, owing to the size of its population and its impressive economic-growth rate. But, measured by per capita income, China will not equal the US for decades, if then. And many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore US military and soft-power advantages, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages.

As for absolute decline, the US has very real problems, but the US economy remains highly productive. The US remains first in total R&D expenditure, first in university rankings, first in Nobel prizes, and first on indices of entrepreneurship. According to the World Economic Forum, which released its annual report on economic competitiveness last month, the US is the fifth most competitive economy in the world (behind the small economies of Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore). China ranks only 26th.

Moreover, the US remains at the forefront of such cutting-edge technologies as biotech and nanotechnology. This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decline.

Some observers worry that US society will become sclerotic, like Britain at the peak of its power a century ago. But US culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than Britain's was, where industrialists' sons sought aristocratic titles and honors in London. And despite recurrent bouts of concern throughout its history, the US reaps huge benefits from immigration. In 2005, foreign-born immigrants had participated in 25 percent of technology start-ups in the previous decade. As Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew once told me, China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, but the US can draw on the world's seven billion, and can recombine them in a diverse culture.

Many commentators worry about the US' inefficient political system. True, the US' founding fathers created a system of checks and balances designed to preserve liberty at the price of efficiency. Moreover, the US is now experiencing a period of intense partisan polarization. But nasty politics is nothing new to the US: its founding era was hardly an idyll of dispassionate deliberation. The US government and politics have always experienced such episodes, and, though overshadowed by current melodramas, they were sometimes worse than today's.

The US undoubtedly faces serious problems: public debt, weak secondary education, and political gridlock, to name just a few. But one should remember that these problems are only part of the picture and, in principle, they can be solved over the long term.

It is important to distinguish the problems that can be solved from those that cannot. Of course, whether the US can implement the available solutions is uncertain; several commissions have proposed feasible plans to change the US' debt trajectory by raising taxes and cutting expenditures, but feasibility is no guarantee that they will be adopted. Still, Lee Kuan Yew is probably right to say that China "will give the US a run for its money," but not surpass it in overall power in the first half of this century.

If so, the gloomy predictions of absolute US decline will turn out to be as misleading as similar predictions in decades past. And, in relative terms, while the "rise of the rest" means that the US will be less dominant than it once was, this does not mean that China will necessarily replace the US as the world's leading power.

The author, a former US assistant secretary of defense, is a professor at Harvard and author of The Future of Power. Project Syndicate.

(China Daily 10/10/2011 page8)