A fallacy of China's slowing GDP growth is using year-on-year percentages as the benchmark. If China's GDP grows at 6.5 percent this year, on a base of almost $11 trillion, the absolute increase (about $700 billion) is roughly double of what it was ten years ago (in 2006, when the economy grew at 12.7 percent). Moreover, because China's population is now only slightly larger, the incremental GDP per capita today is well larger than what it was in those so-called high-growth years. Yet the problem of China's unproductive growth is real, which has lead to overcapacity in industry, housing and infrastructure. China's story is not a simple one.
Who advocates "China's Collapse"? Some economists are pessimistic about China's short-term prospects, but almost none would use the term "collapse". Rather, some of their comments are taken, selectively, by those who have a vested interest in China's "collapse"—book writers of sensationalized doom, political analysts viscerally opposed to China's system of governance, financial short-sellers seeking short-term profits, and the like.
I've been amused that purveyors of the "China Collapse" theory are often also purveyors of the "China Threat" theory. How China could "threaten," which requires power, at the same time it "collapses," which reduces power, is a mystery. Although self-refuting, the threat-collapse nexus reveals a common connection, as "threat" and "collapse" both emanate from a built-in bias towards China. But even as "China Collapse" advocates remain few in number, the idea has gained in prominence. Why?
Two factors drive "China's Collapse" in the public eye. First is not so much that China's economy has become more fragile but that world markets have come to depend too much on China's growth. China is still a developing country and cannot bear the world's burden. Second is that China's increasing clout generates a natural backlash (exemplified by that American worker).
Foreigners exaggerate China—in both directions. "When China was called 'the sick man of Asia,' we weren't so 'sick'," a Chinese minister told me; "and now that foreigners think China is so strong, we aren't so strong." The relevance is direct. Even though China's economy has internal contradictions, like overcapacities, and remains vulnerable to external shocks, like global slowdowns, although China's economy is slowing, it is not collapsing.
Politically, there are no broad, boiling tensions as collapse advocates contend. The vast majority of the Chinese people want social stability, a watchword in China, which is required for increasing standards of living. The Chinese government is exquisitely sensitive to instability and reacts rapidly to even early indicators of unrest. This can lead to stricter regulations, such as in media and social media, but almost everyone would accept the tradeoff.
China's economy will cycle but it won't collapse. I'm sorry if this disappoints a few false prophets, but assuming that people do what is best for them, other than the handful that make their money bashing China, no one should root for China's collapse. China's success is the world's success.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, political/economics commentator, and international corporate strategist. He is the host of Closer To China with R.L. Kuhn on CCTV News.
The opinions expressed here are those of the writer and don't represent views of China Daily website.