Recent years have seen the Dalai Lama admit the fact that the former government of Tibet had never ruled the Tibetan-inhabited areas outside today's Tibet Autonomous Region. However, he argued that "it is hard to retain the features of the Tibetan race if there are people of the Tibetan ethnic group living outside Tibet". He then declared the need to establish "a Tibetan entity where all people of the Tibetan ethnic group live". However, it is the fact that one ethnic group in China may be found in different administrative regions and one administrative region may be home to several ethnic groups. This is the result of historical changes and constitutes a salient feature of the relations between different ethnic groups in China. While people of the Tibetan ethnic group living in various Tibetan-inhabited areas in China retain the same Tibetan characteristics and maintain close ties especially in religion and culture, they speak different languages and have different habits. In the meantime, they maintain close ties politically, economically and culturally, especially economically. Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, eight Tibetan autonomous prefectures, one Tibetan-Qiang autonomous prefecture, one Mongolian-Tibetan autonomous prefecture, and two Tibetan autonomous counties were established. Such administrative division is made in accordance with the features of various ethnic groups and with the aim of seeking future development; it embodies factors related to ethnic groups and regions as well, the integration of political and economic factors; hence it is good for the ethnic groups concerned to seek common development within the big Chinese family.

From this we see the so-called "enlarged Tibet autonomous region" runs counter to the law that governs the development of various ethnic groups in China. If all of the 55 ethnic minorities founded their own unified autonomous areas, there would conflicts between various ethnic groups and social disorder in China. all these would be a bane for the economic and cultural development of these ethnic groups. One can not see much relations between the "enlarged Tibet autonomous region" and efforts to protect the Tibetan features. However, it is easy for one to see the Dalai Lama's ulterior motive: eventually seeking Tibetan independence.

The fourth point is the Dalai Lama's distortion of the meaning of the autonomous region. At the end of last year, when the Dalai Lama was interviewed by reporters, he said: "Tibet enjoys the right to special treatment in accordance with the Law on National Regional Autonomy", but "this right has not been really enjoyed." Sangdong, the chief Galoon of the Tibetan government-in-exile recently said that "the policy of the national regional autonomy is very important, but the Chinese Government lacks fairness in following the policy, which does not conform to the Law on National Regional Autonomy". They impress people that the Dalai Lama favors the national regional autonomy but wishes to see the fulfillment of various rights specified in the law.

What is the Dalai Lama up to? Here are two examples: In the "five points", he said: "The course of real peace can only begin when the Communist troops have all pulled out". In his "seven points", he said: "A regional peace conference should be convened to guarantee demilitarization in Tibet". Recently, the Dalai Lama entrusted a professor in Hong Kong to draft a document called "limitations and possibilities of achieving 'high-level autonomy' within the framework of the Chinese Constitution and the Law on National Regional Autonomy", which outlines a Tibetan "peace zone" where "no troops should be deployed". But it is well known in the world that deploying troops in its own territories is a requirement of national defense and also a symbol of sovereignty. Withdrawing its troops from its own territory so as to turn that part of its territory into a "peace zone" will not be approved by any country upholding its sovereignty and dignity in the world. Neither will China. From this, we see the "high-level autonomy" the Dalai Lama pursues is empty-worded.

The other example is one related to the relations between various ethnic groups in areas following the national regional autonomy system. Article 4 of the PRC Constitution says all ethnic groups in the PRC are equal, and no one is allowed to discriminate against and suppress any ethnic group, sabotage national unity, and engage in national separation. Article 48 of the Law on National Regional Autonomy also stipulates that the organ responsible for autonomy in areas exercising national regional autonomy shall work to guarantee all local ethnic groups enjoy equal rights. However, the Dalai Lama said in his "five points" that the Central Government "must stop moving people into Tibet and Han people already in Tibet must return to China". Sangdong also said last year that, "the areas where the Tibetans reside should have Tibetans exercising regional national autonomy, and the Han and other ethnic groups should act like guests and Tibetans' rights should not be restricted in any form". All people with knowledge of Chinese history know the areas at the rim of the so-called "enlarged Tibetan area", especially the rim of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, formed a region witnessing considering movement of peoples and where Tibetans, Han, Hui, and Mongolians eventually came to live together and rely on each other. They are all masters of the areas where they live. Making non-Tibetans move away from where they have been lived for many centuries so as to satisfy the Dalai Lama goes against the PRC Constitution and the Law on National Regional Autonomy, and shows that, once the Dalai Lama becomes leader of Tibet again, he will follow policies featuring national discrimination and national purge. Such a policy caused heavy deaths in the mid-20th centuries in some countries and the Dalai Lama should know this.

From the above analysis, we see the Dalai Lama is talking about seeking a way out "within the framework of the Chinese Constitution" but, at the same time, he sticks to his principles that run counter to the PRC Constitution. This shows that what he pursues is a swindle and nothing stands between his "high-level autonomy" and "Tibetan independence". When the Dalai Lama made public his "five points" and "seven points", the Central Government immediately made it clear that this showed he had not given up his stand for "independence of Tibet". Any form of "independence of Tibet" won't do. In 1987, a US congressional source declared: "The United States has not shown any support for the Dalai's five points geared to turn Tibet into a peace zone, as behind them is the obvious intention to promote Tibetan independence". The Tibetan Bulletin operated by the Dalai clique carried a signed story in 2004 saying: 'Elements who stand for independence think the five-point peace proposal and the Strasbourg proposal are a kind of betrayal, because they have failed to read between lines. So long as conditions are ripe, they will play a role geared to gaining real independence.'

The five and seven points are what the Dalai Lama first proposed some 20 years ago. Some may say he did so at that time because he was under the strong influence of foreign anti-China forces; but what he proposes as the "middle way" is something different. This writer has been examining a "publicity pamphlet" on the middle way issued in June 2005 by the "foreign affairs and news relations department of the Tibet government-in-exile". Highlights of the "manual on the middle way" show it to be closely related to the five and seven points. The manual says the Strasbourg proposal was put forward by the Dalai Lama and determined in a democratic way and hence should not be altered. Sangdong told Tibetans who went to India from China for Buddhist rituals in 2005 that "all the work should be done on the basis of the 1987 five points and 1988 Strasbourg proposal of the Dalai Lama. They are our political program".

It is true that when the Dalai dished out his five and seven points, he was under foreign influence. In June 1987, US House of Representatives proposed a revision regarding human rights in Tibet, which was the first Western resolution against China related to Tibet in the 1980s. In September the same year, the Dalai Lama visited the United States ostensibly as a religious leader. He dished out his "five points" at a US human rights group meeting on September 21. Some reported that the "five-point" speech was drafted by people within the US group according to the US document entitled "Revised Scheme on Human Rights in Tibet". The American scholar Goldstein pointed out in his work Dragon and the Snow Lion that the new offensive launched by the Dalai government-in-exile and its friends in London, New York and Washington DC was meant for Western audiences, instead of the Chinese.

A few years ago, this writer met a former official with the Dalai side. He mentioned a discussion among them on the Dalai's speech to the US Congress in 1987. Some said then that turning Tibet into a peace zone was a strategy used by the British invaders in the past and the Qing emperor had rejected it; therefore, the Chinese Government would not agree. Obsessed with the support from the West, no one had a sober mind.

As a matter of fact, the Dalai himself changes his attitude with the changing tide in international affairs. In September 1990, the Dalai told a Dutch reporter: "Changes in the Soviet Union bring new hope for Tibetan independence and give us courage and force to continue seeking Tibetan independence". In April 1991, he attended a welcome party held by the US Congress, where he said that "if Beijing gives me a cold shoulder on this proposal" he would then return to seeking independence. In October 1991, the Dalai Lama gave a lecture at Yale University in which he stated that he believed the Tibetans would win independence soon just as the three Baltic states had done so [from the Soviet Union] and remained as determined as ever to attain the goal as throughout "42 years of occupation"; "the Strasburg statement obviously could no longer play its role, and this is why I had to declare recently that I have given up abiding by these terms". Misjudging the international situation, the Dalai Lama declared in 1993 that he would not make contacts with a "destabilizing Chinese government", and cut off all channels for arranging a meeting with the Central Government. Seeing China enjoys continued peace and stability, as well as sustained economic development, the Dalai Lama ventured to demand contacts with the Central Government again. In 2003, he told a French reporter: "If no results can be achieved in two or three years of negotiations, I would find it hard to explain to the young that the 'middle way' is more effective than seeking independence"; "if I fail, these young people would raise torches and cry for independence". Given the fact that the Dalai Lama gives out different signals at different times and even at the same time, one can hardly agree his "middle way" is different from "Tibetan independence."

As a matter of fact, the "middle way" is a philosophy, according to which one should not take extreme actions. But the Dalai's "middle way" has nothing to do with the "middle way" philosophy. The Central Government has made public its views on the Dalai's "middle way" over the past 20 years, but the Dalai Lama still hates to say bye to his proposals which are "independence of Tibet" in nature. It left no stone unturned to bargain with the Central Government by changing words. This writer holds that the Dalai Lama is in a blind alley. We Tibetans value highly the Sagya Sayings, which says: "One should refrain from thinking to do things one could not do; and eat food which can hardly be digested;" "a fool takes a wrong way, simply because he is a fool; when a wiseman takes a wrong way, he needs must find out the why." If the Dalai Lama is sincere in improving ties with the Central Government, he needs, first and foremost, to have an objective understanding of the political reality in Tibet and, on this basis, re-think his political propositions. Only by truly giving up his "Tibetan independence" policy, can the Dalai Lama win the confidence of others and create conditions for him to do something in the interest of Tibet.